Inflation and Inequality by Stefania Albanesi
Inﬂation and Inequality
Stefania Albanesi∗
Bocconi University and IGIER
First version: November 2000
This version: March 2001
Abstract
Cross-country evidence on inﬂation and income inequality suggests that
they are positively correlated. I explore the hypothesis that this correlation
is the outcome of a distributional conﬂict underlying the determination of
ﬁscal policy.
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Observations from a large sample of countries for the time period between 1966
and 1990 reveal a positive correlation between average inﬂation and measures of
income inequality. I explore the hypothesis that this correlation is the outcome of
a distributional conﬂict underlying the determination of ﬁscal policy. I describe
a political economy model in which equilibrium inﬂation is positively related to
the degree of inequality in income due to the relative vulnerability to inﬂation of
low income households.
I consider a monetary economy in which income inequality is an increasing
function of exogenous diﬀerences in human capital and the nature of the trans-
action technology gives rise to the result that low income households are more
vulnerable to inﬂation. In addition, I model the political process as a bargaining
game over the determination of ﬁscal policy, following Bassetto (1999). I assume
that ﬁscal policy is given by a linear income tax and that the level of public spend-
ing is exogenous. Furthermore, taxes cannot be raised and the government must
resort to inﬂation if an agreement is not reached. Since high inﬂa t i o ni sc o s t l yf o r
all types of households, there is an incentive to reach an agreement. Low income
households stand to lose more than high income households if an agreement is
not reached, given their relative vulnerability to inﬂation. Consequently, their
bargaining position is weaker. Higher inequality, arising from greater diﬀerences
in income across households, leads to a greater relative vulnerability to inﬂation
of low income households and a further weakening in their bargaining position.
I show that these features of the environment imply that equilibrium inﬂation is
positive and increasing in the degree of inequality in human capital. For a plau-
sibly parametrized version of the economy, I ﬁnd that the correlation between
inﬂation and inequality predicted by the model is quantitatively signiﬁcant and
can account for a signiﬁcant fraction of the one in the data.
T w oe l e m e n t sa r ek e yi nt h i sf r a m e w o r k : the relative vulnerability to inﬂation
of low income households and the fact that the distributional conﬂict underlying
the determination of ﬁscal policy is described as a bargaining game. I now provide
a brief description of the economy and discuss the role of these features.
The economy builds on Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) cash-credit good model.
There are two types of households who diﬀer in their exogenous endowment of
human capital. I assume that larger human capital results in higher labor pro-
ductivity1. Households supply labor and purchase consumption goods. They
perform transactions either with previously accumulated currency or by using a
1Inequality in human capital is due to features of the economy, like access to public education,
which I take to be exogenous.
2costly payment technology, produced by a transaction services sector. Households
trade-oﬀ t h ec o s to ft r a n s a c t i o ns e r v i c e sa g a i n s tt h ef o r e g o n ei n t e r e s ti n c o m ea s s o -
ciated with holding currency. Following Erosa and Ventura (2000), I assume that
there are economies of scale in the costs of the alternative payment technology.
This implies that low income households face a higher average cost of transaction
services than those with high income. Accordingly, they hold more currency and
are more vulnerable to inﬂation.
The assumption of economies of scale in the cost of acquiring transaction ser-
vices implies that the model is consistent with cross-sectional evidence on house-
hold transaction patterns and with indirect evidence on the distributional conse-
quences of inﬂation. Erosa and Ventura (2000) report that in the US low income
households use cash for a greater fraction of their total purchases relative to high
income households. Findings in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) also support
this notion. They estimate the probability of adopting ﬁnancial technologies that
hedge against inﬂation and ﬁnd that is positively related to the level of household
wealth and inversely related to the level of education. Easterly and Fischer (2000)
use household polling data for 38 countries and ﬁnd that the poor are more likely
than the rich to mention inﬂation as a top national concern. This suggests that
low income household perceive inﬂation as being more costly. They also ﬁnd that
the likelihood of citing inﬂation as a concern is inversely related to educational
attainment.
I model the political process as a sequential bargaining game. There are
two main reasons to prefer a bargaining model. First, a bargaining scheme is
applicable to any situation in which government decisions emerge from the con-
sensus between diﬀerent constituencies. In addition, it is capable of capturing
an important feature of most political systems, that minorities are able to ex-
ert signiﬁcant pressure on the policy outcome. In the bargaining equilibrium I
study, the political power of diﬀerent groups of households is a function of their
economic attributes. Speciﬁcally, the relative vulnerability to inﬂation of low in-
come households implies that high incomeh o u s e h o l d sh a v eag r e a t e rw e i g h ti nt h e
political process. Extending the arguments in Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and
Persson and Tabellini (2000), one can show that models of electoral competition
b a s e do np r o b a b i l i s t i cv o t i n ga n dc o s t l yl o b b y i n gw o u l dy i e l ds i m i l a rp r e d i c t i o n s .
Alternative strategies have been used to formalize a distributional conﬂict
ultimately resulting in high inﬂation. Alesina and Drazen (1991) study a war
of a attrition between political groups over the timing of a ﬁscal reform. In the
interim, public expenditures are ﬁnanced with seignorage. The distribution of
the burden of the reform is exogenous and asymmetric information on the costs
of inﬂation for each group delays the reform. A bargaining framework has the
3advantage that the allocation of the ﬁscal burden is determined endogenously
as a function of the distribution of economic characteristics in the population.
Moreover, positive inﬂation occurs in equilibrium even with perfect information
on the costs of inﬂation. Mondino, Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1996) consider a
model in which identical pressure groups set government transfers ﬁnanced with
seignorage. A pressure group approach, however, is better suited to describe
conﬂict over policies that target narrow segments of the population.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I document the correlation between
inequality and inﬂa t i o ni nS e c t i o n2 .I nS e c t i o n3 ,Id e s c r i b et h ee c o n o m i ce n v i -
ronment and illustrate the distributional consequences of inﬂation. In Section 4,
I study the Ramsey equilibrium for this economy. This establishes a benchmark
useful for understanding the properties of the environment and interpreting the
results. Section 5 describes the bargaining equilibrium in detail and characterizes
the suﬃcient conditions for inﬂation to be positively correlated with inequality.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Correlation between Inﬂation and Inequality
Figure 1 is a scatter plot of the average inﬂation tax, deﬁned as π/(1 + π) where
π is the percentage inﬂation rate, and the Gini coeﬃcient2 for a sample of 51
industrialized and developing countries, averaged over the time period from 1966
to 1990. Constraints from availability, quality and comparability of the data on
inequality restrict sample size. A more detailed description of the data and the list
of included countries is provided in the Data Appendix. Figure 1 shows a strong
positive correlation between inequality and inﬂation. Figure 2 is a scatter plot of
inﬂation on an alternative measure of inequality, y40/y60, given by the ratio of
the average income per capita in the top 40% of the population to average income
per capita in the bottom 60% of the population, computed based on the share
of total income accruing to each quintile3. The same positive relation emerges.
2The Gini coeﬃcient is a summary statistic for inequality derived from the Lorenz curve. It
is deﬁned as the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality line to the
area between the perfect equality line and the perfect inequality line. The Lorenz curve plots
the relation between the cumulative percentage of the population and the proportion of total
income earned by each cumulative percentage.
3I choose this measure instead of the more common index of social distance, deﬁned as
the ratio of the percentage of total income accruing to the top 20% of the population to the
percentage of total income accruing to the bottom 20% of the population, because I am interested
in focussing on inequality between broader income categories. The measure I adopt and the social
distance index are positively related, however, implying that inﬂation is also positively correlated
to the index of social distance.
4Figures 3 and 4 plot the inﬂation tax against the Gini coeﬃcient for OECD4 and
developing countries, respectively. Again a positive correlation between inﬂation
and inequality is present in both sub-samples.
I report some statistics on inﬂation and inequality for the sample in Table
1.A. The simple correlation between inﬂation and the Gini coeﬃcient is 0.21 for
the full sample, while the correlation between inﬂation and y40/y60 is 0.345. A
group of four countries, Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia and Honduras, stand out for
having low inﬂation but very high inequality. Excluding these countries from the
sample increases the correlation between inﬂation and the Gini coeﬃcient to 0.39.
I also compute OLS estimates of the linear relation between inﬂation and
inequality. Findings are reported in Table 1.B for the inﬂation tax transforma-
tion, which reduces the extent to which extreme rates of inﬂation dominate the
estimates and captures the non-linearity of the relation between inﬂation and
inequality. The estimated slope coeﬃcient is 0.4561 (the t-statistic6 is 5.07 and
the R-squared 0.425) for the full sample. This corresponds to a 2% rise in the
inﬂation tax rate associated with a one standard deviation (7 points) increase
in the Gini coeﬃcient. The corresponding increase in the percentage inﬂation
rate is given by 2 ∗ (1 + π). The non-linearity of the relation between inﬂation
and inequality can also be captured by splitting the sample between high and
low inﬂation countries and using the rate of inﬂation as a dependent variable.
An increase in inequality corresponding to a 7 point rise in the Gini coeﬃcient
corresponds to an increase in the average inﬂation rate of 45.8 percentage points
for the full sample and of 7.84 percentage points for OECD countries7.
I also evaluate the conditional correlation between inﬂation and inequality. I
ﬁrst condition on GDP per capita, which is an important indicator of the ability
to collect revenues from direct taxation and presumably is negatively correlated
with inﬂation. I ﬁnd that the correlation between inﬂation and inequality after
conditioning on GDP per capita is still strong and positive, as shown in ﬁgure 5
which plots the residuals from a regression of inﬂation on GDP per capita against
residuals from regressing the Gini coeﬃcient on GDP per capita. Institutional
variables have been found to be important determinants of inﬂation. Edwards
and Tabellini (1993) ﬁnd a positive correlation between political instability and
4The sample of OECD countries comprises countries members of the OECD as of 1973.
This excludes Mexico and the Republic of Korea which are included in the group of developing
countries.
5T h es i m p l ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nt h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient and y40/y60 is equal to 0.62.
6Standard errors are White-heteroskedasticity consistent.
7The slope of the regression of percentage inﬂa t i o no nt h eG i n ic o e ﬃcient is 6.55 (t-statistic
2.80) for the full sample. Results are similar with the alternative measure of income distribution.
For OECD countries, the slope coeﬃcient is 1.1285 (t-statistic 4.1438).
5inﬂation and Cukierman (1992), among others, documents a negative correlation
between inﬂation and central bank independence. In ﬁgures 6-8 I display the
scatter plot if the residuals from regressing inﬂation and the Gini coeﬃcient on
political instability and central bank independence. The correlation between in-
equality and inﬂation is robust to conditioning on these institutional variables.
For developing countries it increases substantially, together with the signiﬁcance
of the estimated coeﬃcient on inequality.
These ﬁndings are consistent with previous studies of the relation between
inequality and inﬂation. Beetsma (1992) presents evidence of a strong positive
correlation between inequality and inﬂation for democratic countries. He ﬁnds
that conditioning on measures of political instability and of the degree of political
polarization, as well as on the level of government debt outstanding, increases the
ability of diﬀerences in inequality to explain variations in inﬂation rates across
countries. Al-Marhubi’s (1997) also conditions on openness.
Romer and Romer (1998) ﬁnd a strong positive relation between inﬂation and
inequality, with quantitatively similar results obtained by regressing inequality on
inﬂation. They also ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant relation between inﬂation and
inequality in the short run over time for the US. Easterly and Fischer (2000) ﬁnd
that direct measures of improvement in the well-being of the poor and inﬂation
are negatively correlated in pooled cross-country regressions. They also ﬁnd that
there is no signiﬁcant relation between the change in inﬂation and measures of
improvements in the well-being of low income households. They also present a
novel set of empirical evidence on the redistributional impact of inﬂation. Using
household level polling data for 38 countries, they ﬁnd that the poor are more
likely than the rich to mention inﬂation as a top national concern. The estimated
probability of mentioning inﬂation as a top national concern by income categories
is 0.36 for the “very poor”, 0.31 for the “poor” and 0.28 for households “just get-
ting by”8. It is substantially lower for high income categories, with an estimated
probability of 0.15 for “comfortable” households and 0.03 for the “very comfort-
able”. This suggests that low income households perceive inﬂation as being more
costly.
3. An Economy with Costly Transactions and Income Inequality
In this section I develop a model economy that builds on Lucas and Stokey’s
(1983) cash-credit good model. Households consume a variety of diﬀerentiated
goods, produced by a perfectly competitive ﬁrm sector, and supply labor. They
are identical but for their endowment of human capital. Larger human capital
8Income categories are self-declared.
6translates into higher labor productivity. Households can purchase consumption
goods with previously accumulated currency or with a costly payment technology,
as in the models of Prescott (1987), Cole and Stockman (1991), Dotsey and
Ireland (1996), Lacker and Schreft (1996) and Freeman and Kydland (2000). A
perfectly competitive ﬁnancial sector provides the services required to use this
alternative payment technology. I will refer to these as “transaction services”.
The cost of providing transaction services depends on the type of good and on
the size of the purchase. Households trade-oﬀ the cost of transaction services
against the foregone interest income associated with holding currency. At low
levels of expected inﬂation households use cash for a relative large number of
transactions, while at high levels of expected inﬂation little cash is used. As in
Erosa and Ventura (2000), I assume that the average cost of transaction services
is non-increasing in the level of total purchases. This implies that in equilibrium
low human capital households will make a greater fraction of their purchases
with cash. This property is consistent with the patters of transactions across
households for the US reported in Avery et al. (1987) and Kennickell et al.
(1987).
The government in this economy ﬁnances an exogenous stream of spending
by printing money, issuing nominal debt and taxing labor income at a uniform
proportional rate. In each period ﬁscal and monetary policy are determined
ﬁrst. Households then purchase credit services and the goods and labor markets
operate. Finally, the assets market opens. In the asset market, households receive
labor income and pay for purchases made with transaction services, they purchase
or issue nominal risk-free bonds and accumulate currency. There is no uncertainty.
I now describe the problems faced by the agents in this economy in more
detail.
3.1. Production Sector
A perfectly competitive industrial sector hires labor to produce a continuum of
consumption goods {c(j)} with j ∈ [0,1] subject to a linear technology:
Z 1
0
c(j)dj ≤ ¯ n,
where ¯ n is labor supplied to the industrial sector in eﬃciency units. By symmetry
and perfect competition:
P (j)=P = W, j ∈ [0,1],
where P (j) is the retail price of good j and W is the nominal wage rate per
eﬃciency unit of labor.
7A perfectly competitive ﬁnancial sector hires labor to produce transaction
services. The cost of producing transaction services in eﬃciency units of labor




¯ z − j
¶θ1
, (3.1)
where θ0,θ1 > 0. Goods j ∈ [0,z] with z ∈ [0,1) can be purchased with the
alternative payment technology free of charge, while goods j ∈ [¯ z,1] with ¯ z ∈
(0,1) cannot be purchased with the alternative payment technology. Perfect
competition ensures:
q(j)=Wθ(j),
where q(j) is the price charged for providing transaction services for the purchase
of good j.
3.2. Households
There are two types of households of measure 0 < νi < 1, i =1 ,2, with ν1 +
ν2 =1 . All households have identical preferences. Type i households have labor
productivity, ξi, for i =1 ,2, with ξ2 > ξ1.
















ρ ∈ (0,1), γ > 0,
for i =1 ,2, where cit (j) denotes consumption of good j by type i and nit labor
supplied by type i at time t.
Households enter the period with Mit units of currency and Bit units of out-
standing bonds. They can purchase goods with currency or with the alternative
payment technology. They pay a dollar amount equal to qt (j) for each good j
they elect to buy with the alternative payment technology. The assumption on
the technology for the provision of transaction services and perfect competition in
the ﬁnancial sector ensure that qt (j) is increasing in j. This implies that house-
holds optimally adopt a cut-oﬀ rule, choosing to purchase goods j ≤ zit with
transaction services and goods j>z it with currency. Concavity implies that
8consumption levels will be the same for goods purchased with the same transac-
tion technology. Consequently, the expression for the consumption aggregator in
equilibrium is:






where ci1t denotes the level of consumption of goods purchased with cash and
ci2t the level of consumption of goods purchased with transaction services, for
i =1 ,29.
Households face the constraint:
Ptci1t (1 − zit) ≤ Mit, (3.5)
on the goods market. During the asset market session, households receive labor
income net of taxes, clear consumption liabilities and trade one-period risk-free
discount bonds issued by other households or by the government. The bonds
entitle their holders to one unit of currency delivered in the following period’s asset
trading section. I assume that neither households or the government default on
their debt. This implies that households are indiﬀerent between holding privately
and government issued bonds which both trade at the price Qt. Total holdings
of debt by agent i at the end of time t are denoted with Bit+1 for i =1 ,2.
Households face the following constraint on the asset market:
Mit+1+QtBit+1 ≤ Mit+Bit−Pt (1 − zit)ci1t−Ptzitci2t−
Z zit
0
qt (j)dj+Wt (1 − τt)ξinit,
(3.6)
for i =1 ,2, where nit is total labor supply by type i. The following no-Ponzi game
condition is also required for the households’ intertemporal optimization problem
to be well deﬁned:
¡
Q−1










Qt0, Φ0 =1 ,
is the discount factor.
9In this set up, the cost of transaction services varies across consumption goods while the
utility weight on each type of consumption good is constant so that all goods with the same
price are consumed in equal amounts. An alternative speciﬁcation in which the optimal level
of consumption varies across goods but the cost of credit services is constant for all goods is
equivalent under certain conditions and would not alter any of the ﬁndings.
93.3. Government
The government ﬁnances an exogenous stream of spending {gt}t≥0 by taxing labor
income at the rate τt ∈ [0,1], issuing debt, Bt+1,and changing the money supply,
Mt+1. The government is subject to the following dynamic budget constraint:
Mt+1 + QtBt+1 + Wtntτt = Pt¯ gt + Mt + Bt, (3.8)
where Qt is the price of nominal bonds and nt is aggregate labor supply in eﬃ-





3.4. Private Sector Equilibrium
The timing of events in each period is as follows:
1. Government policy is determined subject to (3.8).
2. Households come into the period with holdings of currency and debt given
by Mit and Bit.
3. Households decide to purchase zit goods on credit.
4. Households, ﬁrms and the government trade in the goods and labor markets.








5. Asset markets open. Households purchase bonds and acquire currency to
take into the following period subject to the constraint (3.6).
Deﬁnition 3.1. A private sector equilibrium is given by a government policy
{¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 , a price system {Pt,W t,Q t,q t (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1] a n da na l l o c a -
tion {ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it,M it+1,B it+1}i=1,2,t≥0 such that:
1. given the policy and the price system households and ﬁrms optimize;
2. government policy satisﬁes (3.8);
103. markets clear.
The following proposition characterizes the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. Ag o v e r n m e n tp o l i c y{¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 , an allocation
{ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it,M it+1,B it+1}i=1,2,t≥0 , with nit > 0 for i =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0, and
a price system {Pt,W t,Q t,q t (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1] constitute a private sector equilibrium
if and only if the conditions (3.8), (3.9) and:
Wt = Pt, (3.10)
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for t ≥ 0, (3.15)
(Rt+1 − 1)(Pt+1ci1t+1 (1 − zit+1) − Mit+1)=0 ,


















≤ 0 for zit = z,
=0for zit ∈ (z, ¯ z),
≥ 0 for zit =¯ z.
(3.16)
for t ≥ 0, and:



























hold for i =1 ,2.
Equation (3.18) is the households’ implementability constraint. It is given by
the intertemporal budget constraint in which prices have been substituted using
optimality conditions and it incorporates the transversality condition. The proof
of this proposition is in Appendix A10.
10A feature of this preference speciﬁcation is that there are no wealth eﬀects on the level and
composition of consumption, which depend on relative prices only. Moreover, in the private
113.5. Distributional Impact of Inﬂation
Households choose the optimal payment structure by balancing the opportunity
cost of holding currency and the cost of acquiring transaction services for the
marginal good bought with currency. This trade-oﬀ is captured by equation
(3.16). The gain from acquiring transaction services for the marginal good bought
with currency is given by the increase in the level of consumption of that good
due to the decrease in its relative price and the reduction in the foregone interest
income associated with holding currency. This gain is increasing in the nominal
interest rate and roughly proportional to the level of consumption. The cost of
acquiring credit services for the marginal consumption good is decreasing in the
level of consumption. Consequently, the per unit gain of adopting transaction
services is greater for high human capital households and for a given level of the
nominal interest rate they make a greater fraction of their purchases with the
alternative payment technology11. Figure 9 illustrates this trade-oﬀ for high and
low human capital households at a given interest rate.
To understand the redistributional implication of this feature of the trans-
action technology, it is useful to deﬁne a household speciﬁc consumption price
index, ˜ Pi
t for i =1 ,2. It is the total cost in eﬃciency units of labor of one unit of
















where zit solves (3.16)12.
sector equilibrium only the aggregate level of employment and the present discounted value of
total labor income for each type of household are pinned down. A higher endowment of initial
assets for type i corresponds to lower equilibrium labor supply for type i, for i =1 ,2.
11Erosa and Ventura (2000) illustrate that this property holds for a large class of marginal
costs that have been adopted in the literature on costly credit.









w = Rci1 (1 − zi)+ci2zi + C (zi),
where w is an exogeous endowment of real wealth. Let:






and denote the expenditure function with e(R;θ) and the value function with v (R;w,θ). Then,
12For a given level of inﬂation, P1
t >P 2
t , since z2t >z 1t by (3.16). Household
optimization implies ˜ Pi
t ≤ Rt−1 and ˜ P1
t ≥ ˜ P2
t , since high income households
always have the option of choosing the same structure that is optimal for low
income households. This implies that the “actual” net real wage in eﬃciency
units is higher for high income households:












So a positive nominal interest rate is equivalent to a higher net real wage in
eﬃciency units for high human capital households relative to low human capital
households, since the latter make a greater fraction of their purchases with the
alternative payment technology.
4. The Ramsey Equilibrium
The Ramsey equilibrium is deﬁned as the private sector equilibrium which maxi-
mizes the government’s objective function, under the assumption that the govern-
ment can pre-commit to policy announcements made at time 0. The government’s






βtui (ci,n i), (4.1)
where ci is deﬁned in (3.3) and ηi is the Pareto weight on type i agents, with
η1 + η2 =1 . I assume that the Pareto weights are time-invariant. The case
ηi = νi corresponds to a utilitarian government.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A Ramsey equilibrium is given by an allocation, a price system
and a government policy such that the allocation maximizes (4.1) and jointly with
the price system and government policy it constitutes a private sector equilibrium.
I characterize the Ramsey equilibrium as the solution to the “Ramsey alloca-
tion problem”, described in detail in Appendix B. In this problem, the government






13chooses an allocation at time 0 subject to the constraint that it be a private sector
equilibrium. I assume Bi0 =0 13.
The government here confronts a trade-oﬀ between eﬃciency and redistribu-
tion. The Friedman rule is the eﬃciency maximizing policy. While labor income
taxation and inﬂation both determine a reduction in equilibrium labor supply, in-
ﬂation also causes an increase in the adoption of costly credit services and distorts
the relative price of consumption goods. However, positive inﬂation amounts to
a transfer in favor of high human capital households and the government has an
incentive to set positive inﬂation when the Pareto weight on high human capi-
t a lh o u s e h o l d si ss u ﬃciently high14. The terms of this trade-oﬀ depend on the
interest elasticity of aggregate money demand, which determines the size of the
deadweight loss associated with inﬂation, and on the degree of inequality. Larger
inequality is associated with a greater relative vulnerability to inﬂation of low hu-
man capital households and a larger redistributional impact of inﬂation in favor
of high human capital households. Since the government’s objective function is
linear in the households’ welfare, an increase in the redistributional gain for high
income households corresponds to a greater incentive to use inﬂation.
I ﬁrst show that the Friedman rule is not necessarily optimal if the government
favors high human capital households and the labor tax schedule is linear. The
result holds for a general preference speciﬁcation in which the consumption aggre-
gator is homothetic. I then present numerical results to illustrate the quantitative
properties of the Ramsey equilibrium.
4.1. Conditions for Optimality of the Friedman Rule
The ﬁrst result links equilibrium inﬂation to the properties of the income tax
schedule.
13The government’s controls are given by {ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it}i=1,2,t≥0 and P0. The level of P0
determines the real value of outstanding nominal wealth, deﬁned as the sum of currency and debt,
and thus deﬁnes the boundary of the households’ intertemporal budget set. I restrict attention
to the case in which Bi0 =0to minimize the inﬂuence of the exogenous initial distribution of
debt on the Ramsey equilibrium.
The Ramsey policy at time 0 is in general diﬀerent from the Ramsey policy for t>0 due
to diﬀerent elasticity of relevant tax bases. High values of P0 amount to a tax on outstanding
nominal wealth and on consumption of goods purchased with cash at time 0, which the govern-
ment is constrained to tax at the same rate. The equilibrium value of the Lagrange multipliers
on the implementability constraints depend on the distribution of debt and currency at time 0
as well as on productivity and the utility parameters. These aspects of the Ramsey problem are
analyzed in detail in Albanesi (2000).
14The linearity of the labor income tax schedule makes labor income taxation redistributionally
neutral.
14Proposition 4.2. If the government has access to individual speciﬁc labor in-
come taxation, the Friedman rule is optimal.
The proof is in Appendix B and is analogous to the one in Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1996). It relies on the homotheticity and separability assumptions on
preferences and on the interiority of the equilibrium. The proof of Proposition 4.2
encompasses the proof that the Friedman rule is optimal for the representative
agent version of this economy15. Heterogeneity introduces the additional condi-
tion for the optimality of the Friedman rule, namely that the government can tax
households’ labor income at diﬀerent rates based on their productivity16.I n t u -
itively, under this assumption net real wages need not be equalized and constraint
(3.15) drops out of the problem. Optimality then requires that the relative price
of goods purchased with currency and with credit be equalized.
Let ¯ ηi denote the “neutral” Pareto weight. It is deﬁned as the value of ηi for
which the constraint that the net real wage be equal across agents is non-binding.
Redistributional consideration have no ﬁrst order eﬀect on the optimal policy for
this value of ηi. The following result holds.
Proposition 4.3. Optimality of the Friedman rule requires η1 ≥ ¯ η1.
The proof is in Appendix B.
The intuition for this result lies in equation (3.21). Since positive nominal
interest rates redistribute in favor of type 2 (high human capital) households by
raising their “eﬀective” real wage, optimality of the Friedman rule requires the
government to be redistributionally neutral or favorable to type 1 (low human
capital) households. The proof of Proposition 4.3 nests a more general result.
If the tax rate on labor can be diﬀerent across households but is subject to the
constraint:
τ2 ≥ τ1, (4.2)
15Optimality of the Friedman rule in the representative agent version of this economy obtains
even though the income elasticity of money demand is below 1 at levels of the nominal interest
rate that justify adoption of the costly credit technology. In Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996),
the Friedman rule is not generally optimal in this case.
They consider an economy with exogenous payment structure and homothetic preferences over
cash and credit goods in which the income elasticity of cash and credit goods is the same. In
an environment with endogenous payment structure, despite homotheticity of the consumption
aggregator, the income elasticity of cash good consumption is weakly greater than that of credit
good consumption. This property implies that the Friedman rule is optimal.
16This is a version of the uniform taxation result shown by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). They
show that access to a suﬃciently ﬂexible income tax schedule is enough to guarantee optimality
of a uniform commodity tax if preferences are weakly separable in leisure and the other goods,
even if the government is pursuing redistributional objectives.
15optimality of the Friedman rule requires η1 ≥ ¯ η1, where τi is the tax rate applied
to labor income generated by type i =1 ,2. In this case, the constraint on re-
distribution only binds if the government favors high human capital households.
Based on these results, I conjecture that if the tax rate on labor is allowed to
diﬀer across households but still subject to less stringent constraints than (4.2), a
version of Proposition 4.3 holds. I plan to verify this conjecture in future research.
4.2. Properties of Ramsey Policy
When the necessary conditions for optimality of the Friedman rule are not satis-
ﬁed, the Ramsey equilibrium inﬂation rate depends on the properties of aggregate
money demand, which determine the size of the deadweight loss associated with
inﬂation, and on the degree of inequality17.
I now study optimal inﬂation for a version of this economy calibrated to match
features of money demand for the US in the post-war period. These features are
reported in Table 2 and the corresponding parameter values are displayed in Table
3. The details of the calibration are illustrated in Appendix D. I set ξ1 =1and
ν =0 .60 and vary ξ2/ξ1 to match the ratio of average income per capita accruing
to the top 40% of the population to the average income per capita accruing to
the bottom 60% in the model to the one in the data (denoted with y40/y60 in
Section 2) for τ =0 .30 and R =1 .0618.
The results are displayed in Table 4. Here the redistributionally neutral dis-
tribution of Pareto weight is ¯ η1 =0 .60 (and ¯ η2 =0 .40). If the government favors
high human capital households, i.e. η1 < ¯ η1, the Ramsey inﬂation rate is positive
and it decreases with η1, the Pareto weight on low human capital households.
The same result holds for other parametrizations with a suﬃciently low value of
the interest elasticity of aggregate money demand.
To trace the relation between inequality and inﬂation, I compute the Ramsey
17For given inequality, the distributional content of inﬂation will be highest at intermediate
levels of the nominal interest rate. At very low nominal interest rate neither type of household
purchases credit services. For extremely high values of the interest rate, given that the marginal
cost tends to inﬁnity for zi going to ¯ z, t h ee c o n o m i e so fs c a l ep r o p e r t yw i l lh a v el i t t l ei m p a c to n
the incentive to adopt, though adoption will still be more costly for low income households.
18This strategy diﬀers from the one adopted by Erosa and Ventura (2000). They use data from
the US Bureau of the Census to devide the population in two groups according to education levels
and compute the mean labor earnings for each group and the average fraction of the population
that belongs to each group. In their calculations the low income group makes up 69% of the
population and the ratio of the average income of high income group to the low income group for
the US is 1.837. Their strategy is not applicable for the cross-country comparison I am interested
in, due to scarsity of accurate and comparable data on education.
16equilibrium inﬂation for increasing values of ξ2 keeping the value of ξ1 ﬁxed19.I
choose a value of the Pareto weight for which inﬂation is positive in equilibrium
for a low value of ξ2 and I adjust government spending so that it is constant as
a fraction total employment. I ﬁnd that equilibrium inﬂation increases with ξ2,
since larger inequality reinforces the distributional eﬀect of inﬂation in favor of
high human capital households.
To gauge robustness, I perturb the parameters which determine the redistri-
butional impact and the aggregate costs of inﬂation. Results are displayed in
Table 5.
I ﬁrst vary the marginal cost of acquiring credit services. For the benchmark
speciﬁcation of θ(·), the parameter θ0 determines the level of the marginal cost
and has the greatest impact on both the price index ˜ Pi and the aggregate cost of
inﬂation20. I compute the Ramsey equilibrium at η1 =0 .40 for diﬀerent values of
θ0. I ﬁnd that equilibrium inﬂation varies inversely with θ0. Reducing θ0 by 50%
causes the equilibrium nominal interest rate to rise to 60% from 15%, doubling
θ0 causes the nominal interest rate to fall to 8% in equilibrium21.
I then explore the sensitivity of the results to ρ. Al o w e rv a l u eo fρ leads
to a lower elasticity of substitution between consumption goods. This induces
households to purchase credit services for a greater fraction of goods and decreases
the ratio ˜ P2/ ˜ P1 for a given interest rate due to the scale economies in the costs
of credit services. Consequently, the redistributional eﬀect of inﬂation in favor of
19Other experiments determine an increase in inequality. One experiment corresponds to
keeping both ξ1 and ξ2 ﬁxed and increasing the percentage of low productivity households in
the population, namely ν1. In this case, the redistributional impact of inﬂation is held constant
but the aggregate interest elasticity of money demand falls as a function of the increased value
of ν1. The second alternative experiment is a decrease in the value of ξ1 for constant ξ2 and
ν1. This experiment corresponds to an increase in the relative vulnerability to inﬂation of low
productivity households. It would also determine a fall in the interest elasticity of aggregate
money demand, thus reducing the deadweight loss associated with inﬂation. Only the second
experiment, and the one illustrated in the paper, can be mapped into the available data on
income quintiles. I conjecture that with this alternative experiment the same qualitative results
would obtain.
20The parameter θ1 d e t e r m i n e st h er a t eo fi n c r e a s eo ft h i sc o s ta saf u n c t i o no fj
21I also analyze alternative speciﬁcation of the transaction technology, of the form:
υ(c,j)=cθ(j)+κ,
where θ(·) is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 )a n dc is the level of consumption of the goods purchased with
credit. The ﬁxed cost preserves the economies of scale property, but the presence of variable
costs decreases the diﬀerence between the relative price of cash and credit goods when the
transaction technology is adopted. However, since this speciﬁcation shares with the benchmark
the property that at a low interest rates the elasticity of money demand is very low, the results
are qualitatively unchanged.
17high income households is stronger. I consider values of ρ between 0.15 and 0.75.
Findings for η1 =0 .40 are in Table 5, where I also report the interest elasticity of
m o n e yd e m a n da tR =1 .08. Equilibrium inﬂation varies inversely with ρ, starting
at 15% for ρ =0 .15 and falling to 0 for ρ greater than 0.55. Since the interest
elasticity of aggregate money demand is not very sensitive to ρ, the variation
in Ramsey inﬂation is due to the diﬀerent redistributional eﬀect of inﬂation for
diﬀerent values of ρ.
5. The Bargaining Equilibrium
In this section, I analyze an explicit model of the political process. I assume
that inﬂation and the tax rate on labor are the outcome of a sequential Nash
bargaining game between households, following Bassetto (1999).
Government policy is determined according to the following mechanism. In
each period representatives are selected at random from each type of household
and bargain on government policy for the subsequent period. The bargaining
takes place before households make any relevant economic decisions for the sub-
sequent period, including currency accumulation decisions. Agreement requires
unanimity. A proposal made by one representative must be accepted by the other.
If the negotiating parties cannot reach an agreement, no taxes can be raised in
the subsequent period and the government must resort to the inﬂation tax to
ﬁnance spending. This choice of threat point reﬂects the idea that the inﬂation
tax is easy to implement, since it doesn’t require parliamentary approval and it
is always feasible -the government can always run the printing press. For simplic-
ity, I assume that the government faces a balanced budget constraint22,s ot h a t
nominal debt is in zero net-supply. I concentrate on stationary Markov equilibria
of this game in which the policy proposals and their acceptance do not depend
on the past history of implemented, proposed or accepted policies. This implies
that failure to agree in any period does not inﬂuence the equilibrium policies in
future periods.
I now proceed to illustrate the equilibrium concept in more detail and char-
acterize the equilibrium outcome.
22I interpret currency as a nominal liability for the government. Since I study a closed economy,
foreign debt is excluded. I also assume that the government cannot conﬁscate goods from the
households
185.1. Characterization
In this section, I provide an operational deﬁnition of a Nash bargaining equi-
librium for this environment, building on the stationarity properties of the un-
derlying economy. To do this, I ﬁrst characterize the private sector equilibrium
exploiting these properties.
Proposition 5.1. Let BiT−1 =0for i =1 ,2 and let government policy be given
by {τt,R t} for t ≥ T − 1. Then, household optimization implies that for any
t, {ci1t,c i2t,z it,n t} with nt =
P
i νiξinit for i =1 ,2 only depends on {τt,R t}.
Moreover, if Bt =0for all t then in equilibrium:
Bit =0for t ≥ T, (5.1)


















where a prime denotes a realization of the variable corresponding to the policy
{τ0,R 0}.
The proof is in Appendix C. Condition (5.1) obtains from the constraint that
nominal debt is in zero net supply and the constant marginal utility of labor,
which implies that the pattern of debt issuance by each type of household only
depends on the real rate of interest in equilibrium.
Representatives bargain over policy for time T at time T − 1 taking govern-
ment policy for T −1 and for t>Tas given23 and the outcome of the bargaining
game for the determination of ﬁscal policy at T is realized at time T − 1 before
households make any economic decisions relevant for time T.T od e ﬁne the bar-
gaining problem, it is helpful to characterize the determination the equilibrium
interest rate for known sequences of tax rates of the type {τ,τ0,τ,...}.
Proposition 5.2. Let BiT−1 =0for i =1 ,2 and let government policy be given
by {τ,R} for t 6= T and {τ0,R 0} for t = T and let ¯ gt =¯ g for all t ≥ T − 1. Then,
















































23I assume that the policy at time 0 is exogenously given. Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 guarantee
that the policy chosen for t =0doesn’t inﬂuence the bargaining equilibrium for t>0.
19with ˜ ui1 = ui1/(1 − zi), ˜ ui2 = ui2/zi and prime denotes a realization of the
variable corresponding to the policy {τ0,R 0}.
Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 show that the private sector equilibrium consumption
allocation in any period depends on the realized policy, given by the tax rate on
labor and the nominal interest rate, for that period only. Equilibrium labor supply
in any period depends on the policy in the current period and on the expected
policy for the subsequent period. The equilibrium property that Bit+1 =0for
i =1 ,2 and all t ≥ T if BiT−1 =0and the assumption that economic policy
is chosen one period ahead of its implementation imply that there are no state
variables for the bargaining problem.
To provide a formal deﬁnition of the bargaining equilibrium, it is also useful
to deﬁne a temporary private sector equilibrium, given by the allocations and
prices arising in any time period for sequences of constant government policies.
Deﬁnition 5.3. A temporary private sector equilibrium corresponding to the
government policy {τt,¯ gt} with τt = τ and ¯ gt =¯ g for t>0 i sg i v e nb ya n
allocation {ci1,c i2,z i,n i}i=1,2 and a sequence of interest rates {Rt} such that
R = R(τ,τ,¯ g), at {τ,R} households optimize and ni = ni (τ,R;τ,R).
The consumption allocation arising in a temporary private sector equilibrium
are characterized in Appendix C.
I now derive the objective function for the Nash bargaining problem. Repre-
sentatives bargaining in period T − 1 over the policy for period T contemplate
various tax rates τ0 for a given value of the current tax rate and of the expected
tax rate for t>T,given by τ.
Based on propositions 5.1 and 5.2, the components of the value function of






















24This expression obtains from considering the components of equilibrium labor supply that
vary with {τ
0,R


























































which simpliﬁed yields (5.4).
20The bargaining problem is deﬁned by:
N(τ,R,¯ g,ξ1,ξ2;p) = argmax
τ0,R0 V
p
1V2 subject to (5.5)
























the “threat point”. It is implemented if the representatives fail to reach an agree-
ment. The value of τT is the lowest non-negative value of the tax rate on labor
for which a temporary private sector equilibrium exists.
Deﬁnition 5.4. A stationary Nash Bargaining equilibrium is given by a govern-
ment policy {τ,R,¯ g} and a temporary private sector equilibrium corresponding
to this policy such that {τ,R} = N(τ,R,¯ g,ξ1,ξ2;p) and R = R(τ,τ,¯ g).
The Nash bargaining equilibrium can be characterized by evaluating the ﬁrst












at R(τ,τ,¯ g)and solving for τ. The term dPi
dτ is the total derivative type i0se q u i -
librium value function with respect to τ. It includes the eﬀect of changes in the
equilibrium value of R as a function of τ as determined by R(τ,τ,¯ g).
If policy were chosen to maximizes type i’s utility only, the term dPi
dτ would be
set to 0. Loosely speaking this term can be taken to represent type i’s preferences
over policy. A higher weight on dPi
dτ corresponds to a bargaining outcome closer
to the one preferred by type 1 agents. Two factors aﬀect this weight: type 1
agents’ exogenous bargaining weight, p, a n dt h et e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t s ,w h i c h
represents how much type 2 households stand to loose in case of non-agreement
relative to type 1 households. I set p =1and focus on symmetric bargaining
equilibria25.
25A natural alternative is to set p = ν1/ν2 so that the bargaining power of type 1 households
reﬂects their relative size in the population.
21If ξ2 > ξ1, type 2 households face a lower average costs of adopting transaction
services due to their higher equilibrium consumption level. This implies that
they stand to loose less in case an agreement over tax policy is not reached,
if the equilibrium nominal interest rate varies inversely with the tax rate on
labor. Therefore, the term in square brackets is smaller than 1 for the bargaining
problem in (5.5) and the bargaining outcome will be closer to the policy preferred
by high income households. Since they are better able to elude the inﬂation tax,
a relatively low tax rate and positive inﬂation will result in equilibrium. Larger
inequality in human capital across households corresponding to a higher value of
ξ2/ξ1 reduces the value of agreement for high human capital households relative to
low human capital households. It follows that inequality and equilibrium inﬂation
are positively related.
I formalize this reasoning in the following proposition in the case of logarith-
mic preferences in consumption. For σ → 1, it is possible to provide an analytical
characterization of the suﬃcient conditions for the bargaining equilibrium inﬂa-
tion rate to be positively correlated with inequality. To show the result I assume
that a certain policy solves the bargaining problem for a given level of inequality
- a given value of ξ2/ξ1 - and prove that the same policy cannot be a solution
to the bargaining problem for an economy with higher inequality, corresponding
to a higher value of ξ2/ξ1
26. I show that the tax rate that solves the bargaining
problem is lower and, consequently, that the equilibrium interest rate is higher in
the economy with higher inequality.
Proposition 5.5. Assume that R1 (τ,τ,¯ g) ≤ 0 in any temporary private sector
equilibrium and σ → 1. Let {τ,R} = N(τ,R,¯ g,ξ1,ξ2;p) with R = R(τ,τ,¯ g)
and
n
ˆ τ, ˆ R
o
= N(ˆ τ, ˆ R,¯ g0,ξ1,ξ0
2;p) with ˆ R = R
¡
ˆ τ,ˆ τ,b ¯ g
¢





















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ξ2
(5.9)
ˆ τ ≤ τ and ˆ R ≥ R.
26I prove the theorem by assuming that an increase in inequality corresponds to an increase
in ξ2 for a given ξ1. The proof also holds for a decrease in ξ1 for a given ξ2.
22The proof is in Appendix C. The assumption R1 (τ,τ,¯ g) ≤ 0 ensures that in
equilibrium the government is operating on the left side of the Laﬀer curve for
both the labor tax and the inﬂation tax. To see this, consider that a lower tax rate
decreases the government’s ﬁscal revenues and increases the equilibrium level of
consumption for both types of households for a given interest rate, inducing them
to choose a higher value of zi and cut their holdings of currency. If R1 (τ,τ,¯ g) ≤ 0
holds, a decrease in the labor tax rate corresponds to a fall in ﬁscal revenues and
an increase in the nominal interest rate corresponds to a rise in inﬂation tax
revenues in equilibrium.
Condition (5.7) ensures that the policy which solves the Nash bargaining
problem for the economy with low inequality is still feasible for the economy with
higher inequality and therefore qualiﬁes as a candidate solution to the bargaining
problem for this economy. Condition (5.8) states that households of diﬀerent
type have conﬂicting views over ﬁscal policy. Low human capital households
would prefer an increase in the tax rate from the current level, while the converse
is true for high human capital households. Condition (5.9) ensures that high
human capital households in the economy with increased inequality do not prefer
a higher tax rate relative to high human capital households in the initial economy.
This is true if τ is suﬃciently high, in other words if τ is suﬃciently greater than
the tax rate which characterizes the threat point.
Under these conditions, due to the conﬂict between households of diﬀerent
types, a weakening of the bargaining position of low income households results
in an equilibrium policy which is closer to the one preferred by high income
households. Increased inequality generates such a weakening, resulting in lower
taxes and higher inﬂation in equilibrium27.
These conditions are all veriﬁed at parametrizations close to the one consid-
ered in Section 4.2. Since these conditions are suﬃcient, the positive correlation
between equilibrium inﬂation and inequality in the bargaining equilibrium holds
for a larger class of economies than that identiﬁed by Proposition 5.5.
5.2. Quantitative Properties
To evaluate whether the correlation between inﬂation and inequality predicted
by this model is quantitatively signiﬁcant, I analyze the bargaining equilibrium
for a plausibly parametrized version of the economy.
27The same results would follow in an model in which the households bargaing over the tax
rate on labor and the level of spending on a public good which additively enters their utility
function. In this case, the threat point would involve inability to provide the public good and
collect labor income taxes.
23The existence of a temporary private sector equilibrium at the threat point
policy requires real money balances to be bounded away from 0. This restricts the
set of parametrizations that can be considered relative to the Ramsey equilibrium.
To ensure this, I set ¯ z below 1 and reduce the degree substitutability between
consumption goods. I display the parametrization is Table 6, accompanied by
information on the properties of money demand at an interest rate of 6%28.
Is e tξ1 =1and compute the bargaining equilibrium for increasing values
of ξ2. I adjust the level of government spending to the productivity diﬀerentials
in a way that guarantees that the bargaining equilibrium policy for lower values
of ξ2 is still feasible at higher values of ξ2. In general, the resulting value of
¯ g is approximately constant as a fraction of total output for all values of ξ2
considered. Even with this strategy for setting ¯ g, the threat-point policy is not
guaranteed to be the same as ξ2 varies. Typically, at higher values of ξ2 the
interest elasticity of aggregate money demand is higher, so that for the same tax
rate higher equilibrium inﬂation results. I set τT as the lowest positive tax rate for





The results for the benchmark parametrization are presented in Table 6.
Larger inequality corresponds to higher inﬂation and the relation between in-
equality and inﬂation is non-linear. Increasing productivity diﬀerentials from 1.8
to 2.1 (which corresponds to a 25% increase in y40/y60) generates a rise in the in-
ﬂation rate of 0.4%. An increase in productivity diﬀerentials from 2.1 to 4 (which
corresponds to a twofold increase in the equilibrium value of y40/y60)c a u s e sa
3% rise in the equilibrium inﬂation rate. The weaker bargaining position of type
1 agents can be seen from the value of agreement in equilibrium. For low human
capital households it is approximately 3 times greater than for high human capital
households.
Table 7 reports results for the same parametrization with θ0 =0 .0421, double
the value in the previous exercise. A higher value of θ0 reinforces the eﬀect of scale
in reducing the cost of transaction services and increases the relative vulnerability
to inﬂation of low human capital households. This eﬀect should strengthen the
correlation between inequality and inﬂation predicted by the model. A higher
value of θ0 also corresponds to a smaller interest elasticity of aggregate money
demand. This causes the inﬂation tax base to be larger and generally produces
a smaller value of the inﬂation rate at the threat point. A lower threat point in-
ﬂation rate increases the relative bargaining power of low income households and
partially oﬀsets the increase in the redistributional eﬀects of inﬂation stemming
from the higher ﬁxed cost of transaction services. The results reported in Table
28Government spending is set to equal approximately 30% of total output in equilibrium for
the purpose of these experiments.
247 show that the equilibrium inﬂation rate is consequently more responsive to an
increase in ξ2/ξ1 relative to Table 6, which is consistent with a greater redistri-
butional impact of inﬂation. For an increase in ξ2 from 2.1 to 4, the equilibrium
inﬂation rate reaches 34% from 12%; a further increase in ξ2 to 4.8 causes inﬂa-
tion to rise to 44%. However, comparison of the equilibrium rate of inﬂation for
the same degree of inequality across Table 6 and Table 7 shows that the eﬀect of
a smaller value of threat point inﬂation is dominant for low levels of inequality,
giving rise to lower equilibrium inﬂation rates.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I explore the hypothesis that the cross-country correlation between
inﬂation and income inequality is the outcome of a distributional conﬂict under-
lying the determination of ﬁscal policy. I study an economy in which inequality
in income ultimately stems from exogenous diﬀerences in human capital and in
which cash is held for transaction purchases. A ﬁxed cost associated with the
use of alternative payment technologies results in low income households holding
more cash as a fraction of their total purchases, consistent with cross-sectional
household data on transaction patterns. This implies that in equilibrium low
income households are more vulnerable to inﬂation. In each period, households
bargain over how to ﬁnance an exogenous level of government consumption. The
government can raise revenues by taxing labor income or by issuing money which
leads to inﬂation. If there is no agreement, the government is unable to levy taxes
and must resort to inﬂation. Low income households have a weaker bargaining
position resulting from their greater vulnerability to inﬂation. Moreover, greater
diﬀerences in income between low and high income households increase the rela-
tive vulnerability to inﬂation of low income households. I show that this implies
that inﬂation is positive in equilibrium and larger inequality corresponds to higher
equilibrium inﬂation. The same result obtains in the Ramsey equilibrium when
high human capital households are weighted more heavily in the social welfare
function.
The scope of the analysis is restricted by the fact that the redistributional
eﬀect of inﬂation is based on heterogeneity in holdings of currency for transac-
tions only. Moreover, the menu of redistributional policy instruments is limited.
However, it is interesting to evaluate whether this mechanism is quantitatively
signiﬁcant and how much of the correlation between inequality and inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
data it can account for. To do this, I compare the slope of the relation between
equality and inﬂation predicted by the model with the one in the data. Results
are reported in Table 8. For the parametrization used for Tables 4 and 6, the
25model predicts a slope of 1.19 in the Ramsey equilibrium and of 0.76 in the bar-
gaining equilibrium. For the bargaining equilibrium in Table 7, corresponding to
a greater redistributional impact of inﬂation, the slope is 4.97. For the available
data (excluding countries with average inﬂation above 60% per annum) the slope
coeﬃcient of a regression of inﬂation on y40/y60 is 6.56. Therefore, the mecha-
nism incorporated in this model is able to account for 11−75% of the correlation
between inequality and inﬂation in the data, depending on the size of the costs of
transaction services. The relation between inﬂation and inequality is non-linear
in the sample, with a higher slope of the relation at higher inequality. The model
also accounts for this eﬀect, as shown in Table 8. In ﬁgure 10, I plot the linear
relation predicted by the Ramsey and by the bargaining equilibrium29 against a
scatter plot of the data. For the bargaining equilibrium I report the relation for
the parametrization with a small and large cost of transaction services, which is
characterized by a greater slope. The slope of the relation between inﬂation and
inequality predicted by the model encompasses the one in the data.
29The intercept is backed out from the data for this exercise.
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297. Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3.2
Assume that an allocation {ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it,M it+1,B it+1}i=1,2,t≥0 , with nit > 0
for i =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0, and a price system {Pt,W t,Q t,q t (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1] constitute a
private sector equilibrium for a given policy {¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 . Then, condi-
tions (3.10) and (3.11) derive from optimality of ﬁrm behavior, conditions (3.9)
and (3.13) from clearing in the goods and assets markets. The other conditions
follow from household optimization.





ui (cit,n it) − µit (Ptci1t (1 − zit) − Mit) − λit [Mit+1 + QtBit+1






where cit is deﬁned in (3.4) and µit, λit are the multipliers on the cash in advance
constraint and the wealth evolution equation, respectively. Denote with uijt and
uint the marginal utility of good j and of labor for households i =1 ,2.
The necessary conditions for household optimization are given by:
ui1t = Pt (µit + λit)(1− zit), (7.1)
µit (Ptcit (1 − zit) − Mit)=0 ,µ it ≥ 0, (7.2)
ui2t = Ptλitzit, (7.3)
−uint = Wt (1 − τt)ξiλit, (7.4)




< 0 for zit = z,
=0for zit ∈ (z, ¯ z),







λitQt = βλit+1, (7.7)
lim
T→∞
βTλiTMiT =0 , lim
T→∞
βTλiTBiT =0 , (7.8)
as well as (3.5) and (3.6). To see that (7.8) is a necessary condition for household
optimization, suppose it does not hold and
lim
T→∞
βTλiTMiT > 0, lim
T→∞
βTλiTBiT > 0.
30(The strictly smaller case is rule out by (3.7).) Then, it is possible to construct
a consumption sequence such that the budget constraint is satisﬁed in each period
and utility for each type of household is greater, violating optimality.
Combining (7.1)-(7.3) yields (3.14), while (7.3) and (7.4) determine (3.15).
The expression in (3.12) follows from (7.4) and uint = γ, (7.7) and (3.10), while
(3.17) follows from (7.1)-(7.3) at t =0 . To derive (3.18), multiply (3.6) by λit
and apply (7.2) and (7.6). This yields:









Now use (7.1), (7.3)-(7.5), multiply by βt and sum over t from 0 to T. Let T go
to inﬁnity and apply (7.8).
Now assume that an allocation {ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it,M it+1,B it+1}i=1,2,t≥0 , with
nit > 0 for i =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0, and a price system {Pt,W t,Q t,q t (j)}t≥0,j∈[0,1]
satisfy (3.10)-(3.18) and (3.9) for a given policy {¯ gt,τt,M t+1,B t+1}t≥0 for which
(3.8) holds. Then, by (3.10) and (3.11) industrial and credit services ﬁrms opti-
mize.
To see that household optimization conditions are satisﬁed consider an alter-




it}i=1,2,t≥0 which satisﬁes the intertemporal





























using (3.12) and the fact that {ci1t,c i2t,n it,z it}i=1,2,t≥0 satisﬁes (3.14)-(3.18) and
that the intertemporal budget constraint holds as a weak inequality using (3.7)













it is deﬁned by (3.4). This establishes the result since (3.13) and (3.9)
guarantee market clearing.
318. Appendix B: Proof of Propositions 4.2 and 4.3
For the purpose of characterizing the Ramsey equilibrium, it is useful to redeﬁne








− γni, for i =1 ,2,
ci = hi (ci1,c i2;zi),
where hi is deﬁned in (3.4) and nit is the quantity of labor sold on the market.










































[λi (ui10 + bi0ui20)mi0]
where
Wi (ci1t,ci2t,z it,n it)=Ui ¡














for t ≥ 0 and i =1 ,2.
The variables λi and ωt are the multipliers on the implementability constraints
and on the resource constraint for i =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0, respectively. The variables
µit are the multipliers for the constraint that the ratio of the marginal utility of
consumption goods bought with cash and on credit be the same for both types,
while χt is the multiplier on the constraint that the nominal interest rate be non-
negative. The variable ζt is the multiplier on the constraint that the net real
wage in eﬃciency units is the same across agents. Since the multipliers µi and ζ
correspond to equality constraints and can be either positive or negative.
32The ﬁrst order necessary conditions for ci1, ci2,a n drt in (8.1) for t>0 are
as follows (I drop time subscripts to simplify notation):







































− ωνi (1 − zi),



















































0=χ(1 − r), χ ≥ 0 and r ≥ 1,
where i indexes agents and j indexes goods. For i =1 ,2:































T h ee x p r e s s i o ni n( 8 . 3 )i m p l i e st h a tζt > 0 for η2 > ¯ η2 and ζt < 0 for η1 > ¯ η1.
Intuitively, ζ < 0 when the government wants to redistribute in favor of type
1 agents, which corresponds to η2 > ¯ η2. In this case, the government would
like type 1 to have a higher real net wage in equilibrium, which corresponds
to u12tξ1/(z1γ) <u 22tξ2/(z2γ). Also, from the ﬁrst order condition for zi it is
straightforward to verify that z2 ≥ z1 follows from ξ2 > ξ1.













































































































Proposition 4.2 states that if household speciﬁc tax rates are available then
the Friedman rule always solves the necessary conditions of the Ramsey allocation
problem.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 2If taxes are agent speciﬁc, the net real wage need
not be equalized across agents in a competitive equilibrium. The ﬁrst order
conditions for the Ramsey problem are the same as for (8.1) with ζt ≡ 0 for




























for i =1 ,2.
(8.8)
Moreover, at the Friedman rule the homotheticity of hi implies hi
11 = hi
22 =
0 and zi =z for i =1 ,2. Then, by (8.7) −(1 − zi)/zi ≤− 1 is satisﬁed, from
which the assertion follows.¥
This proof is analogous to the one in Christiano, Chari and Kehoe (1996) and
relies on the separability and homotheticity properties of household utility.
I now prove Proposition 4.3, which asserts that η1 ≥ ¯ η1 is a necessary condi-
tion for optimality of the Friedman rule.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . 3Optimality of the Friedman rule implies that the































































































34since at the Friedman rule hi























The optimality of the Friedman rule also implies:












Using (8.9), the condition in (8.11) is equivalent to:






Since ξ2 > ξ1 implies z2 ≥ z1 at any value of r, optimality of the Friedman
rule requires ζ < 0, which is equivalent to η1 ≥ ¯ η1¥
9. Appendix C: Proof of Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.5
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 1The ﬁrst part of the proposition follows from (3.14)
and (3.15). Let ri denote the relative price of current consumption in terms














in equilibrium. This implies that both types of households will want to
purchase bonds for τt+1 < τt and want to issue bonds for τt+1 < τt,s ot h a t
35Bit+1 =0for i =1 ,2 will hold in equilibrium. For τt+1 = τt households
are indiﬀerent between holding and issuing bonds. In this case, Bit+1 =0
by assumption. The expression for ni follows from the dynamic budget
constraint, substituting prices and government policy using the households’
ﬁrst order conditions (7.1)-(7.8), under the restriction that the cash in ad-
vance constraint holds with equality.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 2Using (5.2) and the resource constraint at t = T
delivers (5.3), from which the statement follows.¥
The following proposition characterizes a temporary private sector equilib-
rium.
Proposition 9.1. A mapping X (τ,¯ g) such that {ci1,ci2,c i,n i,z i;R}i=1,2 = X (τ,¯ g)
characterizes a temporary private sector equilibrium if and only if ci1, ci2, ci,z i







































ξi (1 − τ)
γPi , (9.7)
and R(·) is implicitly deﬁn e db y( 5 . 3 ) .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . 1The ﬁrst order conditions in Proposition 3.2 char-
acterize a private sector equilibrium. The condition in (9.1) follows from
(3.15), (9.5) and (9.7). The condition in (9.4) follows from (3.14), while
(9.2) follows from (5.2) evaluated at τ0 = τ and R0 = R using (9.5), (9.6)
and (9.7).¥
36Proposition 5.5 characterizes the suﬃcient conditions for increased inequality
to correspond to higher inﬂation in the bargaining equilibrium.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . 5Proof of this Proposition requires establishing that
the expression in (5.6) which is equal to 0 for the low value of ξ2 is non-
negative at ξ0
2 > ξ2, due to the quasicovexity of Pi with respect to (1 − τ),
which implies that Pi is quasiconcave with respect to τ. Given (5.9), it is
suﬃcient to show that V2 is decreasing in ξ2. From (5.4) and the character-
ization in Proposition 9.1, the analytical expression for the value function


























1−ρ − θ(zi)=0 , (9.9)
for zi interior, and (9.9) is derived from (3.16) and Proposition 9.1. Diﬀer-

































To see that V2/V1 is decreasing in ξ2, it is suﬃcient so analyze the derivative

















3710. Appendix D: Calibration
Here I describe the strategy to determine the parameters values displayed in Table
3.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution also determines the elasticity of
labor supply with respect to the real wage. A value of σ smaller than 1 is re-
quired to ensure that consumption and labor supply are gross substitutes and that
equilibrium labor supply increases with the net real wage. I set σ =0 .7 which
corresponds to a value of the elasticity of household labor supply with respect
to the real wage of at most 33%. Estimates of the labor supply elasticity vary
greatly in the literature, as documented by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1996)30. I perform a sensitivity analysis by varying this parameter between 0.60
and 1. The results on Ramsey inﬂation do not appear to be highly sensitive to
the value of σ.
The parameters ρ, θ0 and θ1 determine the properties of money demand. I
set them to match the estimates of the interest elasticity of M1 and the ratio
of the M1 to output in the US economy for the post-war period reported by
Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and also used by Erosa and Ventura (2000). These
statistics are reported in Table 2. The substitutability between consumption
goods allows an extra degree of freedom in the calibration, since ρ also needs to
be pinned down. The value of ρ determines the sensitivity of currency holdings
to changes in the nominal interest rate for a given payment structure. Iu s e
results in Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998) to determine an upper bound for
ρ. They run a regression of inverse velocity for the US on the nominal interest
rate and the relative size of the banking sector, which they interpret as a proxy
for the size of the credit services sector. They measure the relative size of the
banking sector as the percentage of bank to total employees. The coeﬃcient on
this variable is an estimate of the interest elasticity of money demand along the
extensive margin (the long run elasticity of money demand) and the coeﬃcient
on the nominal interest rate measures the interest elasticity along the intensive
margin (the short run interest elasticity of money demand). Their estimate of
−1.15 for the coeﬃcient on the nominal interest rate corresponds to ρ =0 .5349
since the elasticity of substitution between consumption goods equals ρ/(ρ − 1)
in the model. I take this value as an upper bound because their estimate uses
M0 v e l o c i t yw h i l eM 1i su s e df o rt h er e s to ft h ec a l i b r a t i o n . T h ee s t i m a t eo f
the overall interest elasticity of money demand in Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein
30Micro studies report a labor supply elasticity close to 0, corresponding to a value of σ close
to 1, but estimates of up 5, corresponding to σ close to 0.16, have been used in macro studies of
the labor supply elasticity.
38(1998) is equal to 10.02, close to double the one found by Dotsey and Ireland
(1996) for M1. I conjecture that the same diﬀerence would arise for the short run
elasticity.
I set government spending so that it equals approximately 30% of aggregate
employment in equilibrium.
11. Data Appendix
The data on inﬂation from Easterly, Rodriguez and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) and
the data on income inequality is from the Deinenger and Squire (1996) source
ﬁle. For most countries the “high quality” data, according to their deﬁnition,
was used. For countries in which such data is based on net of tax income, data
from the Luxemburg Income Study based on before tax income was used instead.
This adjustment is made for Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the UK. For
Argentina no comparable data with national coverage is available. The measures
provided are based on household surveys conducted in urban centers and the
greater Buenos Aires area.
Political instability is measured as the actual frequency of transfers of power
in the period 1971-1982, from Edwards and Tabellini (1992). A transfer of power
is deﬁned as a situation where there is a break in the governing political party
control of executive power. It measures the instability of the political system
by capturing the changes in the political leadership from the governing party
or group to an opposition party. It varies between 0 and 1, where 0 represents
perfect stability. Data on central bank independence is from Cukierman (1992).
Legal central bank independence is measured based on a number of indicators,
including the power of the central bank governor, the independence in policy
formulations and in the deﬁnitions of objectives and on the presence of limitations
on lending to the treasury. The included index measures overall independence
for the 1980’s. The values of this variable range from 0 (minimal independence)
to 1 (maximum independence). The turnover rate for central bank governors is
the average number of changes per annum in the period 1950-1989 and measures
actual central bank independence. The IMF International Financial Statistics are
used for data on GDP per capita.
I provide a list of countries and variables included in the sample below.
39Country Gini 66-90 y40/y60 % Inflation 66-90 Political Instability Legal Independence Turnover
Argentina 40.13 3.53 375.41 na 0.44 0.93
Australia 39.53 3.15 8.06 0.154 0.31 na
Austria 37.99 2.39 4.59 0.077 0.58 na
Bangladesh 35.33 2.74 13.51 0.019 na na
Belgium 30.45 2.15 5.50 0.077 0.19 0.13
Bolivia 52.74 3.53 561.33 0.538 0.25 na
Brazil 55.91 6.43 262.26 0.000 0.26 na
Canada 31.84 2.43 6.39 0.154 0.46 0.1
Chile 53.12 4.87 83.35 0.154 0.49 0.45
Colombia 50.83 4.76 20.03 0.154 na 0.2
Costa Rica 45.02 4.18 15.84 na 0.42 0.58
Denmark 37.12 2.53 7.66 0.308 0.47 0.05
Dom.Rep. 46.27 4.15 14.82 0.154 na na
Ecuador 51.28 3.96 21.07 0.231 na na
Egypt 48.40 2.50 11.18 na 0.53 0.31
El Salvador 44.20 4.60 12.22 0.231 na na
Finland 35.53 2.60 8.18 0.308 0.27 0.13
France 40.48 2.68 7.28 0.077 0.28 0.15
Germany,Fed.Rep. 32.13 2.43 3.57 0.000 0.66 0.1
Greece 40.85 na 13.91 0.308 0.51 0.18
Guatemala 57.83 5.61 10.212 na na na
India 37.18 na 8.13 0.154 0.33 0.33
Indonesia 40.30 2.53 21.79 0.000 0.32 na
Ireland 37.20 3.11 9.70 0.308 0.39 0.15
Israel 37.07 2.85 66.11 na 0.42 0.14
Italy 35.82 2.45 10.08 0.000 0.22 0.08
Japan 34.60 2.86 5.56 0.000 0.16 0.2
Korea, Rep. of 35.20 2.75 11.62 na 0.23 0.43
Mexico 52.62 5.68 35.08 0.000 0.36 0.15
Netherlands 30.27 2.37 4.89 0.385 0.42 0.05
Norway 32.27 2.58 7.03 0.308 0.14 0.08
Pakistan 35.81 2.23 8.67 0.231 0.19 na
Paraguay 47.40 na 14.45 0.000 na na
Peru 49.49 6.37 504.18 0.154 0.43 0.33
Philippines 45.90 4.32 12.97 0.000 0.42 0.13
Portugal 38.70 2.87 15.38 0.385 na na
Spain 33.70 2.18 10.81 0.154 0.21 0.2
Sweden 31.64 2.29 7.63 0.154 0.27 0.15
Tanzania 41.28 3.04 19.60 0.000 0.48 0.13
Thailand 42.15 4.13 6.26 0.385 0.26 0.2
Trinidad and Tobago 46.27 4.07 10.46 0.000 na na
Turkey 45.29 4.81 33.42 0.692 0.44 0.4
UK 32.93 2.52 9.07 0.154 0.31 0.1
Uruguay 41.47 na 63.596 na 0.22 0.48
USA 35.58 2.87 5.89 0.231 0.51 0.13
Venezuela 42.59 3.79 13.72 0.154 0.37 0.3

















Figure 2: Inflation Tax and Income Differentials− Full Sample
































Figure 3: Inflation Tax and Inequality− OECD



























































) Figure 5: Correlation conditional on GDP per capita− Full sample























































































) Figure 8: Correlation conditional on instab− Developing
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Figure 10: Predicted relation between inequality and inflation